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Abstract: This paper focuses on regional organisations, looking at how they are studied 
in international relations and especially in international political economy. Regions are 
considered to occupy a place midway between the state and the global order. This paper 
mainly assesses how regions are affected by systemic factors. One key issue is how 
global-level changes are shaping regional organisations. A second issue is the regions’ 
capacity to meet the challenges and difficulties resulting from global events. In terms of 
regionalism, the two systemic factors studied here are globalisation and multipolarity.
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Resumo: Este artigo focaliza o estudo das organizações regionais e analisa o fenômeno 
através da disciplina de relações internacionais e, em particular, da economia política 
internacional. Considera-se que as regiões ocupam um lugar intermediário entre o 
estado e a ordem global. O objetivo central deste trabalho é avaliar como as regiões são 
afetadas por fatores sistêmicos. Portanto, a pergunta sobre a qual se baseia esta reflexão 
é: como as mudanças mundiais estão dando forma às organizações regionais? Este 
tema dá origem a um segundo que se refere à capacidade das regiões para enfrentar os 
desafios e as dificuldades resultantes de fatores mundiais. As duas variáveis sistêmicas 
estudadas aqui em relação ao regionalismo são a globalização e a multipolaridade.
Palavras chave: Globalização. Competição regional. Multipolaridade.
Resumen: El presente artículo enfoca el estudio de las organizaciones regionales 
y analiza el fenómeno a través de la disciplina de relaciones internacionales y en 
particular de la economía política internacional. Se considera que las regiones ocupan 
un lugar intermedio entre el estado y el orden global. El objetivo central de este trabajo 
es evaluar cómo las regiones se ven afectadas por factores sistémicos. Por lo tanto, la 
pregunta sobre la cual se basa esta reflexión es ¿cómo los cambios a nivel mundial 
están dando forma a las organizaciones regionales? De este tema surge un segundo que 
se refiere a la capacidad de las regiones para enfrentar los desafíos y las dificultades 
resultantes de factores mundiales. Las dos variables sistémicas estudiadas aquí en 
relación con el regionalismo son la globalización y la multipolaridad.
Palabras clave: Globalización. Rivalidades regionales. Multipolaridad.
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Introduction
This paper focuses on regional organisations, looking at how they are 
studied in international relations and especially in international political 
economy. As concepts, ‘region’ and ‘regionalism’ are not viewed here as the 
link between a state’s local and national levels. Instead, they are considered to 
occupy a place midway between the state level and the international system. 
When considering global regions, the concept of regionalism is hard to define 
– since the theories about it and resulting interpretations do not always line 
up. However, this paper considers regionalism to be a social construction – 
i.e. an action space where public players (states, federal entities, international 
institutions) and private players (businesses, NGOs, universities, unions) 
interact formally or informally – that produces standards and therefore creates 
political meaning.
Regionalism is a trend worldwide and in every continent, tracing its 
origins to the period just after World War Two. Since formally starting in 
the 1950s, regionalism has seen two major waves. The first wave was 
highly influenced by the ideological context of the Cold War and the bipolar 
confrontation. Yet the second wave of regionalism, beginning in the 1990s 
and the focus of this paper, was mainly determined and shaped by a series of 
systemic factors and notably by changes in the international balance of power 
after the end of the Cold War and the shift of world power.
This paper focuses on the way in which changes globally are shaping 
regional organisations, as well as the regions’ capacity to meet the challenges 
and difficulties arising from two systemic factors – globalisation and 
multipolarity. The paper is divided into four parts, to better tackle this research 
topic and to provide a comprehensive answer to the question about how 
systemic factors have shaped regionalism. The first part looks at the reasons 
for a regional repositioning of the international players in the period after the 
Cold War. Part two focuses more on globalisation as a lever for transforming 
our societies and therefore as a force that is driving and shaping regionalism. 
Although globalisation appears to be a key factor in regionalism’s revival, 
should regional organisations be viewed as stumbling blocks or as building 
blocks? The third part thus seeks to explore the extent to which regionalism 
is a challenge or a driving force for globalisation. Lastly, part four assesses 
today’s globalised multipolar economy – the aim being to explore how far 
regional organisations are being shaped by this new global context of diffused 
power.
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Understanding the regional repositioning of  
international players
In the history of international relations, regionalism clearly grew most 
in the period after the Cold War. Regionalism’s revival, which began in the 
second half of the 1980s, would far surpass regionalism’s importance and 
integrating effects in earlier periods. That is because the post-Cold War 
international system found itself increasingly confronted with the emergence 
of new regional organisations and the relaunch of old regional agreements that 
were being shaken out of their lethargy (Fawcett and Hurrel, 1995; Gamble and 
Payne, 1996; Mattli, 1999; Santander, 2008; Telò, 2014). Besides the revival 
of the European integration project, there was fresh impetus for other regional 
initiatives. These included the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), 
the Caribbean Community (Caricom), the Economic Community of West 
African States (Ecowas), and the Southern African Development Community 
(Sadc). Furthermore, there have been several notable examples of new regional 
spaces, among them the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta), the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Apec), the Arab Maghreb Union (Amu), the 
West African Economic and Monetary Union (Uemoa), the Southern Common 
Market (Mercosur), and the Central American Integration System (Sica).
Systemic factors have played a key role in regionalism’s strong resurgence 
in the post-Cold War period. Among these factors was the disappearance of the 
bipolar world – a world notable for the rivalry between two nuclear superpowers 
that sought to dominate and shape the international space through their own 
blocs as well as via their respective (and diametrically opposed) political 
and ideological projects. For over 40 years, this East-West confrontation 
seriously hampered region-building initiatives – which started after World 
War Two – in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America. This pressure made 
it harder for most initiatives to get going. Yet the Cold War’s end removed 
that constraint, helping to liberate players on the international stage from the 
bipolar world’s restrictions. This freed up new spaces for players to operate, 
enabling cooperation or regional integration links to be created worldwide. 
Europe was the first continent to benefit from the systemic changes, 
by resuming its regional integration project and becoming more important 
globally (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Söderbaum and Van Langenhove, 
2006). The White Paper by the Jacques Delors European Commission in 1985 
and the Single European Act of 1986, which proposed completing the European 
Community’s single market, laid the foundations for boosting European 
regionalism. When the bipolar world ended, there was great enthusiasm for 
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the European project: many European leaders yearned to turn the European 
Community into an economic and even a political superpower (Georges, 
1996). The new European ambitions had a domino effect, stimulating regional 
initiatives worldwide (Baldwin, 1993, 1-23). These were driven especially by 
the new impetus for the European project, which led to fears elsewhere in the 
world of the rise of a “fortress Europe” (Gamble and Payne, 1996). Such fears 
played a role in the regional repositioning of the US-American power after the 
Cold War and eventually the negotiations to set up Nafta.
Given that national economies always depend more on a growing global 
interdependence, countries of the South and particularly businesses in Latin 
America and South-East Asia started to worry that regionalism’s rise in Europe 
and North America would reduce their own access to international markets. 
So these countries became committed to collective regional projects. They 
believed this was the answer to the rise in or relaunch of regional spaces in 
the industrialised world, as well as the best response to their fears of becoming 
increasingly marginalised in international relations. This concern grew from 
the paralysis in multilateralism during the period between the late 1980s and 
the early 1990s. The Uruguay Round of the multilateral trade negotiations 
was derailed by the high tensions and major trade disputes among the period’s 
leading international public and economic stakeholders – the United States, 
Japan and the European Community. 
This situation merely reinforced the overall impression that the multilateral 
negotiations were doomed to fail, which in turn hastened the rise in regional 
initiatives. With the growing appetite for free trade, deregulation and global 
economic competition, regionalism was seen as a strategic alternative for the 
public and private players. In this way, they could protect themselves from the 
likely failure of multilateral negotiations and in so doing temper any fears they 
had of operating within a limited single market. For political leaders seeking 
guarantees of free trade, a commitment to regionalism was the only way to 
meet the private sector’s expectations of an economy of scale. Enthusiasm for 
regionalism grew even stronger, because of the major powers’ stranglehold 
over the multilateral negotiations. Due to an imbalance in the power struggles 
within multilateral negotiations, third countries began to believe they could in 
future carry more weight by asserting their own positions through collective 
bodies at regional level.
Is globalisation driving regionalism?
Geopolitics helped to drive regionalism after World War Two, just as 
globalisation stimulated it in the post-Cold War period. Thus, geopolitical 
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and security factors played a vital role in the rise and shaping of regional 
organisations in the bipolar era. Yet the accelerated pace of economic 
globalisation – which resulted in more openness, competition and the 
interlinking of national economies – was one of the most important systemic 
factors behind the regional repositioning of public and private players after 
the Cold War (Santander, 2000; Hveem, 2006; Solingen and Malnight, 
2016).
For over 40 years, the global political economy has faced major structural 
changes, resulting in the consistent overlapping of national economies and 
a continual shift in the balance of economic power. During the ‘embedded 
liberalism’ period, for 30 years after World War Two, a certain balance was 
found in the international political economy between the welfare state and 
international liberalisation (Ruggie, 1983). This balance was disrupted in the 
1970s when the Bretton Woods financial system ended, leading to a new phase 
for the global political economy.
The capitalist world experienced a real change in its economic 
development model. The focus would now be on supply-related policies 
and therefore on reducing state intervention in the economy, which boosted 
private initiatives and above all transnational business. Government policies 
were increasingly driven by the concept of economic performance. This led to 
strategies for deregulation, privatisation and liberalisation of goods, services 
and capital. Most political leaders were preoccupied with setting up competitive 
and stabilising macro-economic policies (tackling inflation, reducing debt, 
and reducing public expenditure) to attract foreign investment. The lifting of 
barriers to the international movement of capital gradually opened the door 
to a political economy that was increasingly globalised – and state authorities 
began to cede their margins for manoeuvre in that area.
This situation was especially obvious in global finance. Financial 
globalisation – helped by new information technologies, which removed all 
time and space barriers – was still closely linked to the globalised trade in 
goods and services, but became far more important in the financial sector, 
which is today seen as the most advanced area of globalisation (Helleiner, 
1994; Burn, 2006; Allegret and Le Merrer, 2015). Financial deregulation 
allowed the world’s financial community to continually evaluate and anticipate 
the authorities’ decisions, thus creating a powerful and anonymous counter-
balance. The financial system has become less controlled, because this 
liberalisation – alongside the development of new technologies – led to the 
emergence of hundreds of thousands of individual investors. At times, these 
financial changes have resulted in increased instability, as seen in the recurring 
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stock-market and exchange crises. These have occurred worldwide over the 
last 25 years, most notably the systemic crisis of 2008. 
In the power struggle between countries’ political authorities and global 
market forces, regionalism came to be viewed by national governments all over 
the world as an effective instrument to exert better control over transnational 
economic flows. Governments also believed that regionalism would allow 
them to reduce their exposure to globalisation’s constraints, by trying to turn 
these constraints to their advantage. Here was an opportunity for states to 
regain, at least partly, some of the economic margins for manoeuvre they 
had lost in their struggle with the market and an opportunity for businesses 
to prepare themselves better for a time when they would compete globally 
(Gamble and Payne, 1996; Nishijima and Smith, 1996; Grugel and Hout, 1999; 
Telò, 2014). 
Regionalism: a challenge or a driving force for globalisation? 
The various regional cooperation or integration processes, which 
emerged after the decline of the bipolar world, developed in different ways. 
Each regional space has evolved according to its own situation and has its own 
specific history. Yet these spaces have been partly influenced by the impacts of 
the changing nature of the world’s political and economic context (Santander, 
2008; Warleigh-Lack, 2008). There is more than one kind of regionalism 
(Marchand et al., 1999), as there are many different forms and types of regional 
organisations. The best way to distinguish them is to consider whether they 
are pursuing a strictly commercial goal or whether they have moved beyond 
that to follow common strategies and are thus becoming multidimensional 
regional processes. So each project follows its own rules and standards, and 
these affect the interaction between the public and private players operating 
in a specific territory.
Some regional groups have an institutional framework, essentially 
only involving cooperation between one state and another. These are more 
flexible and less ambitious cooperation processes, as they aim to ensure more 
harmonisation of the state players’ policies, whilst respecting the sovereignty 
of each one. By contrast, other groups are called regional ‘integration’ 
projects because they bring together institutions that are intergovernmental 
and supranational. Unlike cooperation, integration implies a gradual transfer 
of some state competences to regional administrative bodies (Quermone, 
2015). Under this system, the states set up mechanisms designed to strengthen 
their mutual cohesion and solidarity relationships, with a view to sharing or 
even uniting their respective sovereignty (De Senarclens, 1998; Ténier, 2003; 
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Best and Christiansen, 2017). In these cases, where the effectiveness of the 
governing authority can be seen at multiple levels (multi-level governance), 
the nation-state is – with the supraregional level, and increasingly with the 
local authorities – one of several decision-making levels (Badie, 1999). 
Some continents, notably Latin America and Africa, have been very 
creative and prolific when setting up regional cooperation projects. However 
regional dynamics are now thriving on every continent. Almost all geographical 
regions are involved in some way in one or more of these processes. Yet 
regional groups all have different levels of economic openness and this level 
will typically depend on the sensitivity of sectors. 
Take for example the ongoing talks to create a free trade agreement (FTA) 
between Mercosur and the European Union. While the former regional group 
is more open in agriculture, the latter is more open in services and industry. If 
we then compare the openness of the Pacific Alliance with Mercosur’s, we see 
that external customs tariffs are on average higher in the first group. Yet the 
champions of open regionalism are the Apec, Nafta and the Pacific Alliance – 
which are qualified by their regional economic cooperation members without 
discriminating against third parties. Because of their indifference to any 
institutional formalism, and their eagerness to ensure successful liberalisation 
of trade between the associates of a ‘concerted unilateralism’ process – these 
groups are regional spaces that best match the idea of neoliberal globalisation. 
Despite the varying levels of economic openness that affect the 
preferential agreements, regionalism since the Cold War has been more of 
a help than a hindrance to globalisation. That is because all these projects 
for regional integration or cooperation are committed to open and liberal 
regionalism. Regionalism like this seeks to take measures that remove barriers 
to trade within a region, whilst refraining from increasing the external tariff 
barriers to the rest of the world – such as those foreseen in the multilateral 
economic rules included in article XXIV of the Gatt/WTO. The idea behind the 
regional preferential agreements is to enable states and businesses to open up 
their economy gradually, so they are better prepared for external competition. 
Therefore the aim is to help set up an integrated global market. 
Nevertheless, some of these agreements have had undesired effects, 
notably the elimination of trade with the rest of the world. A shift in trade 
like this prompted many academics to say that regional agreements were a 
stumbling block to globalisation and that they could even be a threat to 
multilateralism and the future of the WTO (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 1996; 
Sapir, 1998). However, the economic ideology behind regional construction 
after the Cold War does not support this assertion. Globalisation can be 
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interpreted as a form of convergence towards a prevailing system of ideas. 
Regionalism today is emerging as part of the international economy, inspired 
for more than 40 years by neoliberal ideology. This kind of regionalism does 
not conflict with the global economy, since the ideas underpinning political 
decisions on regional cooperation issues draw their epistemological force 
from a sort of convergence of neoliberal ideology (Gamble and Payne, 1996; 
Higgott, 1997).
Some countries are part of several regional agreements. The logical 
conclusion is that this further promotes global trade liberalisation, rather 
than threatening or slowing it. This is backed up by the fact that preferential 
agreements are increasing and becoming more intertwined. Regional spaces 
are also eager to develop trade links with other regional blocs, following the 
rules of trade multilateralism. Together these networks are driving international 
trade relations and they help to promote the development of international trade 
and globalisation.
By organising the development of a regional space through economic 
policies for restructuring, decision-makers lend support to the philosophy for 
and reasoning behind economic competition that is inspired by globalisation. 
They create economies of scale, which are so vital in a world driven mainly 
by an exports economy, compensating for the restrictions of an internal market 
and helping businesses to stay competitive. Regional associations have also 
often become favoured spaces for implementing structural adjustment policies. 
These are administered, typically worldwide, by globalisation institutions such 
as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The aim is to set 
up macroeconomic environments that are stable and boost the credibility of 
a region’s national economies in the eyes of the outside world and potential 
investors in particular. In this way, setting up preferential agreements with 
neighbouring countries aims to bring an economic policy discipline to national 
economies, with the goal of compensating collectively for the loss of national 
autonomy at regional level (Phillips, 2006).
International financial institutions (IFIs), the architects and guarantors 
of the globalised economic order, are traditionally reluctant to praise regional 
preferential agreements. Yet they still put these agreements on their agenda 
and regularly encourage them. The OECD, IMF and WB were all quick to 
acknowledge regionalism’s usefulness after the Cold War, seeing it as a way to 
spread the deregulation and liberalisation policies that these players promote, 
and which are so characteristic of the neoliberal global order (OECD, 1994; 
IMF, 1992; WB, 1998). Since its launch in 1995, the WTO – which is seen 
as the ‘temple’ of global free trade – has concluded that “(…) far more than 
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is often recognised, the regional and multilateral integration projects are 
complementary rather than conflict with one another in the search for trade 
openness” (WTO, 1995, p. 3). 
This is why it may make more sense now to speak of ‘neo-regionalism’, 
since the Cold War’s regionalism was based on an inward-oriented economic 
development model. The prefix ‘neo’ was added to post-bipolar regionalism, 
establishing a link with the international ideological context that prevailed 
after the Cold War: in other words, a link with neoliberal globalisation. 
With globalisation of the market-based mechanisms, all the inward-oriented 
development strategies found themselves in retreat, and the new liberal 
congruity of economic policies fostered regional openness far more than 
previously (Petiteville, 1997; Higgott, 1997; Mittelman, 2000; Santander, 
2000). This explains the preference for the term ‘neo-regionalism’ rather than 
‘regionalism’, when referring to today’s regionalist trend. 
Ultimately, the growth in regionalism can be seen as an intermediate 
stage between national-level economic policies and liberalism resulting from 
globalisation. Neo-regionalism and globalisation are not antithetical processes. 
Trade policy has long been the focus of studies assessing the development of 
regional agreements (do they help or hinder the liberal system of international 
trade?). These studies typically ignore other factors, such as capital mobility. 
If national leaders get involved in regional projects, they are also typically 
looking to benefit from foreign direct investment – which means they can call 
again on the international financial deregulation stemming from globalisation. 
As a result, if globalisation consists of a series of processes and a philosophy 
of economic management, then regionalism should be seen as an example 
of globalisation, and the two evolutions reinforce each other (Higgott, 1997; 
Hettne, Inotai and Sunkel, 1999; Hook and Kearns, 1999).
Where does regionalism fit into today’s multipolar world?
National decision-makers see regionalism as a way to maintain some 
control over globalisation, even though the theories of regionalism match 
the liberal thinking behind globalisation. This view is common, because the 
multilateral framework cannot solve the problems and challenges arising 
from globalisation. Connections may be hard to forge globally. But at 
regional level – with a small number of players, geographical proximity and 
sometimes close links between partner countries’ economies – connections 
can be deep.
In the eyes of key players, greater trade liberalisation worldwide 
was severely hindered by the lengthy paralysis in the cycle of multilateral 
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negotiations and by the failures of several ministerial conferences at the WTO. 
They also saw this situation as an extra threat for global governance. Since the 
end of World War Two, international relations have been framed by a set of 
rules and international treaties. These multilateral standards are regarded as a 
means to connect international players whenever possible, allowing them to 
solve any global challenges together. This framework was formed around the 
United Nations and derived organisations, with the growing support of public 
and private players. Multilateralism has continued to develop, alongside the 
proliferation of international organisations. Not to mention the multiplication 
of international meetings and multilateral dialogue, plus the increasing 
diversity of areas covered (human rights, environment, trade, development, 
humanitarian aid) backed by reports, action plans and monitoring sub-
committees. The rise of multilateral institutions and rules contributed to the 
first plans for an international order of some kind. It was hoped that this order 
would facilitate cooperation between global players, encouraging them to 
find common solutions to common problems. When the bipolar world ended, 
international organisations thrived for a while. Today they find it increasingly 
difficult to operate.
Several issues highlight the shortcomings and limitations of the 
multilateral institutional machinery. They include the stalled multilateral trade 
negotiations, difficulties dealing with or preventing many of the armed conflicts 
(Balkans, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Mali, Iraq, Syria, 
Yemen, and Sudan), and the lack of global solutions to the challenges posed 
by migratory crises. These shortcomings are heightened when the governments 
of some leading nations are quick to deploy unilateral foreign policies that 
structurally weaken the foundations of the world’s legal architecture. Examples 
of this are decisions made by the George W. Bush administration (2001-2008) 
and initiatives taken by President Trump (Gowan, 2017) to remove the United 
States from organisations (pulling out of Unesco), agreements (pulling out of 
the ‘New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants’) or from UN resolutions 
(Security Council Resolution 242 on the Middle East).
So, although they may not be obsolete, multilateral organisations suffer 
at the hands of leading nations’ unilateral policies, and due to the growing gap 
between declared ambitions and the results achieved. These organisations are 
also held back by a number of problems that stem from the persistent feeling, 
shared by most players, that they lack fair representation and that power is 
distributed unequally (Sur, 2017; Placidi-Frot, 2017).
Worldwide, against a background growing multipolarity, more and more 
countries are electing political leaders who are partly inspired by political 
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radicalism. This comes at the same time as the rise of nationalist and populist 
movements, and just when a growing number of politicians are calling for 
‘deglobalisation’. Those political forces are often busy trying to regain some 
of their authority and power, as well as championing a return to a world where 
the balance of power dominates. However, they are also quick to criticise the 
international liberal order and related institutions, including the multilateral 
or regional organisations (Niblett, 2017).
Consequently, regionalism now finds itself confronting a political distaste 
for globalisation, as well as the twin crises of troubled multilateral organisations 
and fading global leadership. Regionalism is also up against a world in which 
the emerging powers (South Africa, Brazil, India, China, Russia, Turkey, Iran 
or others) seek a shift in global power and where international power relations 
are increasingly multipolarised. The global economy is today challenged by 
politics, now making a remarkable return to centre stage, as well as geopolitical 
games among the major global powers (Jean, 2018). Against this background, 
regionalism is being reassessed and is increasingly at the whim of nations and 
groups competing for power. This situation stirs rivalry between the projects 
for cooperation or regional integration within the same continent. It also spurs 
competition among regional blocs from different continents, as the blocs strive 
to shape in their image the standards and rules of the nascent political order 
and multipolar economy (Santander, 2016a).
The players in this global game notably include China, Russia, the United 
States and the European Union. All are seeking to shape globalisation to match 
their societal preferences. China and Russia – alongside other emerging Brics 
powers – are calling for international political and economic structures that 
better align with the way that global power is truly divided in the early 21st 
century. They are now part of joint or individual regional cooperations, where 
the challenges are not limited to these projects’ frontiers. Firstly, they are all 
working to promote the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), by giving 
this project not just a security focus but also an economic, cultural and scientific 
one. They are also in talks with many third countries. Secondly, Russia and 
China alike have ideas for new regional cooperation projects. Moscow is busy 
developing the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which would like to create 
a free trade area and a customs union with countries like Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Russia hopes to include other countries from 
the former Soviet bloc and especially Ukraine, which Russian authorities 
consider the ‘cradle of Russian culture’ and a key strategic, economic and 
energy challenge – in the struggle for regional influence between the EU, Nato 
and the United States.
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China has also been working on its own strategic projects, notably to 
develop a new Asian economic and political order. In 2012, China proposed 
its Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a project that 
will create a huge free trade area between 16 countries in the Asia-Pacific, 
and especially among the Asean+61 (Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific or 
FTAAP). For China’s President Xi Jinping, reshaping the geography of global 
trade under Chinese patronage also means launching a ‘new Silk Road’ and 
a ‘21st century Maritime Silk Road’, officially called the OBOR or ‘one belt, 
one road’ (MFARRC, 2015). 
The new Silk Road will involve linking China and Europe by rail while 
the Maritime Silk Road aims to create an economic area that would connect 
South-East Asia to the Mediterranean via the Indian Ocean, the Gulf and Suez 
Canal (Wang, 2016; Tiezzi, 2014). To form this enormous economic area, 
Chinese authorities have set up the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB). In 2016, the AIIB started to shoulder project risks and, along this 
terrestrial belt and maritime road, to finance the construction of extensive 
infrastructure and communication routes such as roads, ports, bridges and 
railways.
These China-backed regional initiatives are partly geopolitical, as they 
were essentially launched to compete with the American strategy known as 
the ‘Asian pivot’. For the Obama administration, this pivot was supposed 
to enable the United States’ redeployment in Asia-Pacific through regional 
megaprojects such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which sought to 
establish a free-trade area between 12 countries in the region; yet China was 
deliberately excluded from the TPP. The ‘Asian pivot’ strategy was about 
driving a process to open markets and to set up new norms, standards and 
regulations that were intended to shape and determine the world’s political 
economy on the basis of American interests (Santander, 2016b).
Although the Republicans’ coming to power in the US in 2017 ended in 
the nation pulling out of the TPP, this does not mean Washington is abandoning 
its regional strategy. The contrary is true, as the Sino-American power struggle 
taking place through regional projects is ongoing. The Trump administration 
has substituted an alternative strategy for the TPP’s free-trade area. This 
strategy first involves creating a ‘quadrilateral alliance’ in Asia, by developing 
close cooperation between the United States, Japan, Australia and India – 
countries in the region that share concerns about China’s growing power. The 
 
1 Asean (Burma, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand 
and Vietnam) as well as Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand.
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next step would be to ensure that the concept of Asia-Pacific region – to which 
China is highly attached – is no longer mentioned in official speech. Instead, 
the focus would be on reviving the idea of an ‘Indo-Pacific region’. According 
to the Trump administration’s national security strategy, this would be an 
area stretching from the west coast of the United States all the way across 
the Indian Ocean and on to the eastern coasts of India (The White House, 
2017, p. 46). 
Using the term ‘Indo-Pacific region’ is aimed at circumventing China by 
the south and as far as possible removing any reference to China. Lastly, the 
US strategy is intended to seal agreements – albeit bilateral ones – with all 
countries in the Indo-Pacific region, by pursuing a transactional approach to 
international relations that would put the United States in a stronger position 
when renegotiating international trade agreements. Just like the George W. 
Bush government did, the Trump administration aims to leverage the American 
market’s attractiveness to gain more concessions from trade third-parties. This 
strategy is not aimed at excluding the United States from globalisation. Instead 
it seeks to enable the Trump administration – which views a trade surplus as 
a symbol of strength – to achieve a key goal: reducing the nation’s structural 
trade deficit. 
As with the Asian pivot strategy, the Indo-Pacific plan backed by Trump 
was conceived to counter China’s influence and its regional projects. As a result, 
whether under Obama or Trump, Washington is still competing with Beijing 
to act as international ‘rule-maker’ – which means decisively influencing the 
process towards globalisation and its rules. China’s grand strategic designs 
tend to promote state power. Yet large state-owned groups and infrastructure 
projects, as well as the plans hatched by Obama and Trump, inherently believe 
more – albeit to different degrees – in the merits of the market, deregulation and 
private initiatives. Nonetheless, the Trump administration sees globalisation as 
a zero-sum game, that is to say a situation where there can only be a winner 
and a loser.
Europeans are still active in this sphere, with the EU inevitably involved 
in the competition between large regional and interregional projects. The EU 
encourages the development and consolidation of regional groups in line with 
global competition worldwide. China’s plans and the Trump administration 
have further prompted European authorities to secure interregional trade 
agreements with regions like Asean, Mercosur or Sadc. In terms of their 
content, the agreements negotiated by the EU have more in common with 
those promoted by the United States than with those pushed by China. 
However, although the EU stands fully behind its guidelines for a barrier-
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free market economy, the EU-supported projects for regional or multilateral 
trade agreements must if possible be based on the rules that apply in Europe 
for intellectual property, services, investments, public tenders or dispute 
settlement (Santander, 2014, p. 65-81). Like the other players mentioned, the 
EU is also eager to be a top international rule-maker, so that it can better shape 
the globalised and multipolar order.
Conclusions
Regions typically develop in different ways and at different speeds, 
because they are driven by diverse political projects. Each regional group has 
evolved according to its own situation and has a unique history. There is more 
than one kind of regionalism, as regional organisations come in many shapes 
and forms. Each regional initiative follows its own rules and standards, which 
influence the interaction between public and private players operating in a 
specific territory.
Yet regionalism is clearly affected by political and economic changes 
in the world – not to mention the actions of leading international powers. 
Although regionalism has staying power, it is continually under construction 
and evolves according to internal political and economic developments. 
International trends also significantly affect regionalism, especially trends 
such as globalisation and the world’s growing diffusion of power.
As a political phenomenon, regionalism is dynamic and ever-changing. 
It can benefit from progress or suffer slow-downs and even setbacks. These 
changes can also result from competition between regional cooperation or 
integration projects, as they vie to shape the standards and rules of today’s 
global political and economic order. Competition between the regions is 
today being intensified by the new realities of the globalised multipolar 
economy.
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